The goal of this paper is to estimate the efficiency cost of one additional euro of revenue through the personal income tax system, considering its simultaneous effects on the labour market and the transport market. More precisely, we seek to derive estimates of the Marginal Excess Burden of marginal personal income tax rates in Belgium considering the subsidization of company cars. We find that taking into account of welfare losses in the transport market adds 5-7 cents to the welfare cost of an additional euro of tax revenue, compared to models that consider only the effects on the labour market. The cost of raising the top marginal tax rate rises by 28% to 58% depending on the model assumptions. As an aside, we estimate tax expenditure on the transport sector via the personal income tax system to be 1.9 billion euro. We conclude that there is scope for welfare improving by base broadening and rate cutting. The framework is applied to analyse the merits of cash-for-car proposals.
This paper seeks to quantify the size and traffic effects of commuting subsidies in Belgium. To this end we implement the most recently available data on both the personal income tax treatment of commuting reimbursement and subsidies to rail commuters in the PLANET model. We find that subsidy rates by tend to differ strongly by mode and by type of reimbursement. Commuting by own car is generally subsidized at low levels, if it enjoys any subsidy at all. Commuting by company car, bike and public transport enjoy relatively high levels of subsidization. Policy simulations show the importance of commuting subsidies in steering the modal split. Both the exemptions for commuting reimbursements as well as subsidies for rail commuters moderately steer traffic away from private transport, while also lengthening the average commute.
Social protection for the costs of long‐term care (LTC) varies widely between countries, and to date there has been no systematic comparison of the experiences of people with LTC needs in different countries. In response to this information gap, the OECD and the European Commission (EC) have established a project to make quantitative comparisons of social protection for LTC in OECD and EU countries, using the typical cases approach. Social protection encompasses both cash benefits, conditional on long‐term care needs, and long‐term care services offered at no or subsidized cost to the user. A data collection questionnaire has been distributed. This report describes how the data for Belgium have been collected. The following schemes are taken into account: the allowance for the assistance of the elderly; the allowances for incontinence and for the chronically ill; the Flemish care insurance; the sickness and invalidity insurance for home nursing care and care in institutions; home care (not nursing care), regulated and subsidized by regional governments; and service vouchers. The data refer to the year 2015.
Within the framework of the sixth state reform, part of the personal income tax has been regionalised. What’s more, in ESA2010, certain tax expenditures which were partly recorded as negative revenue in ESA95 are now recorded as general government expenditure. These changes motivate a revision of the personal income tax model which is used both for the short and medium term projections made by the FPB and for variant analyses. The new model makes a distinction between the "prepayment" tax (payroll tax and advance payments) and the "enrolment" tax (which fixes the amounts due under regional and local additional levies). It provides a better link to the macroeconomy and explicitly takes into account the schedule of tax enrolment.
This paper seeks to understand how the current tax subsidy for the ownership and use of employer-provided cars influence behaviour by its recipients. We first seek to clarify how it affects the choice about cars, i.e. the number of cars a household owns, their engine size and their value. Second, we study the impact of the subsidy on the propensity to use a car for commuting and the number of kilometres driven for commuting and for other, private purposes. The analysis has been made on the basis of the BELDAM survey, a rich dataset on mobility behaviour in Belgium.
This Working Paper discusses the elasticity and the progressivity of personal income tax. Both concepts deal with the same object but from a different perspective: elasticity has a temporal angle, whereas progressivity has a cross-sectional angle. Progressivity is here estimated based on the distribution statistics of taxable income and taxes. In addition, a method is introduced to assess the negative relationship between progressivity and income growth. In retrospect, that relationship contributes to explain the evolution of progressivity during the past decades. Looking ahead, it can be used to project – under an unchanged policies assumption – an evolution of elasticity different from the constant elasticity hypothesis, typical of short- and medium-term models, and from the unitary elasticity hypothesis, typical of long-term models. In this context, the impact of the larger share of pensions in the tax base on progressivity is taken into account. This Working Paper also discusses the regionalization of personal income tax approved within the framework of the Institutional Agreement for the sixth Reform of the State of 2011. More specifically, it demonstrates how the treatment of elements from the tax system with a fixed dimension (zero tax bracket, tax relief) and elements with a progressive dimension (income scale) influences the specific elasticity of the regional and the federal tax shares in personal income tax.